POPULATION TODAY

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Is being Middle Class an exercise in nostalgia? (See page 3.)

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FROM THE EDITOR'S DESK

The annual task of gathering data for the *World Population Data Sheet* brings with it new and often fascinating glimpses into the more obscure corners of geography. The units listed on the Data Sheet are not always "countries," an often undefinable, even controversial term, but "geopolitical entities," a term that covers, we hope, any eventuality. Some favorite entities:

Pitcairn Island is the least populous, and may also be the only place in the world that can claim a *complete* census count – a population of 55 in 1985, with 0.0 percent overcount/undercount. Pitcairn Islanders are descended from the mutinous crew of the *Bounty* and regularly report their demographic data to the UN's Statistical Office. They also have no taxation.

The world is so immense that it contains two Christmas Islands, the most populous of which is an external territory of Australia lying in the Indian Ocean, where its 2,000 or so Chinese and Malay inhabitants are principally engaged in phosphate mining. Its capital is The Settlement, its principal port Flying Fish Cove.

Andorra lies high in the Pyrenees Mountains of Spain. This tiny enclave's economic mainstay is tourism. The country's unpaid soldiers – all officers – supply their own weapons and uniforms to present the flag at official ceremonies. The Andorran army fought its last battle 700 years ago. Sounds like easy duty.

All of these places figure in the Data Sheet's world totals. There is no room to print their entries individually, but world population wouldn't be the same without them.

– Carl Haub

SPEAKING GRAPHICALLY

The Wage Gap: U.S. Median Income for Selected Groups of Persons 25 Years and Older



Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census

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A Species in Danger or Evolution?

Is the U.S. middle class – vanishing?

Over the past half-decade, this provocative question has received wide media exposure, and conclusions have ranged sharply.

Pessimistic writers point to the relative wage stagnation that began in the early 1970s, the shift from manufacturing to services – from the union label to low paying fast-food – and the persistence of a significant poverty-stricken population.

Optimistic commentators point to the high absolute wage levels that many workers receive, and the creation of new industries, jobs, and households. They assert that many unfavorable comparisons with the American economic past are based on nostalgia or amnesia.

What *is* the middle class, anyway? It can mean what *Websters Ninth Collegiate Dictionary* calls "a heterogeneous socioeconomic grouping composed principally of business and professional people, bureaucrats, and some farmers and skilled workers sharing common social characteristics and values." Another way is to ignore social-class differences and divide up the population by income, and label as middle class a defined population who bracket the median U.S. income ($20,991 per year per employee, for all domestic industries, as of 1985).

In practice, definitions of the "middle class" are, in economist Herbert Stein's words, "so flexible, data so limited, the possibilities of statistical manipulation so great that almost any argument can be said to have empirical support."

Economic Change

It's a plausible assumption that social changes in the way people work and spend have been affected by the considerable economic changes that began in the early 1970s.

For one thing, the U.S.'s economy, like many around the world, is growing more slowly. The U.S. gross national product grew at an annual rate of about 3.1 percent from 1945 to 1973. From 1973 to 1985 it grew at an average of about 2.5 percent. The income distribution may not have changed significantly, but the pie being divided is growing more slowly.

The exact causes of these economic slowdowns remain in dispute, but no one disputes the major effect of OPEC's 1973 and 1979 oil price hikes. U.S. wages are also under pressure because of the often lower wages abroad, as the U.S. endeavors to compete in what is increasingly a single world economy. And other less tangible factors may have been at work, including slowing productivity during this period.

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The Middle Class family, circa World War II

Wages for the labor force as a whole have been largely stagnant for many years. Expressed in constant dollars, weekly wages declined after 1973 (when they were $187) and have never reached that peak again (they were $168 in January 1988, expressed in constant 1977 dollars).

> Expressed in constant dollars, U.S. weekly wages declined after 1973 and have never reached that peak again

During this period the income of households and families suffered less but also felt the economic impact. In fact, they came to a virtual halt – median family income reached a peak of $29,172 (in 1985 dollars) in 1973. Since that time it has dropped by 6 percent in constant dollars, rebounded, and then dropped again during the early 1980s. In 1985 it stood at $27,735.

Some have argued that the wage stagnation is due to the economy's shift away from manufacturing to service industries. This is an issue that remains in dispute among economists, since the service sector encompasses a wide range of high- and low-income jobs, but one view is that wage stagnation has apparently had an equitably depressing effect on both manufacturing and service.

Others argue that a younger age distribution is the reason, ever since the mid-1970s when the baby boomers began to swell the labor force. But economist Lester Thurow, after adjusting for ages, has calculated that distribution of earnings is no different than without age-adjustment. And the work force, whose median age declined starting in the 1960s, is aging again.

Whatever the reason, measured in

Continued on next page

A Species in Danger?

Continued from preceding page

constant dollars, the distribution of income has sagged in the middle since 1970, as shown in Table 1. Families earning between $20,000 and $50,000 in constant dollars have shrunk by 6.7 percentage points of the total. The segment earning $50,000 or more dollars has increased by 5.3 percentage points. And the segment earning under $20,000 dollars has also increased by 1.3 percentage points.

However, measuring income distribution another way, economists Frank Levy and Richard C. Michel, who have written extensively about the middle-class question, point out that if the population is divided into fifths according to income, the past four decades have seen each fifth continue to receive about the same proportion of national income.

Table 1. Distribution of U.S. Families by Income (in Constant 1985 Dollars)

	No. fams. (in thousands)	Percent distribution of families								
		Under $5,000	$5,000-9,999	$10,000-14,999	$15,000-19,999	$20,000-24,999	$25,000-34,999	$35,000-49,999	$50,000 up	Median income($)
1970	52,227	3.8	8.2	9.9	10.8	12.2	22.9	19.3	13.0	27,336
1975	56,245	3.3	8.9	10.4	11.1	11.2	21.1	20.0	13.9	27,421
1980	60,309	3.9	8.9	10.4	11.1	10.6	20.5	19.5	15.1	27,446
1981	61,019	4.3	9.1	11.3	11.0	11.1	19.6	18.9	14.6	26,481
1982	61,393	5.1	9.3	11.1	10.9	11.4	19.5	17.9	14.8	26,116
1983	62,015	5.2	9.2	10.8	11.0	10.7	19.2	18.3	15.6	26,642
1984	62,706	4.8	8.9	10.5	10.6	10.4	18.7	19.0	17.0	27,376
1985	63,558	4.8	8.5	10.2	10.5	10.3	18.6	18.8	18.3	27,735

Source: 1987 *Statistical Abstract*, Table 731, based on Current Population Survey.

Demographic Shifts

Concurrent with economic changes are social changes in the way the U.S. population lives and works.

Comparing the 1980s to benchmarks such as 1960 shows labor force participation is continually growing. From 1960 to 1985 it grew from 59.2 percent to 64.8 percent of the over-16 U.S. population. This increase, while moderate in terms of the entire population, occurred despite the steady decline in labor participation by males – from 82.4 percent to 76.3 percent. Females, meanwhile, have poured into the national work force. During 1960-1985, their participation soared from 37.1 percent to 54.5 percent. (Women earn 64 percent of men, as of 1984, for fulltime, year-round work.)

Not surprisingly, the 54 percent of husband-wife families with wives in the labor force earn considerably more – 48 percent more – than those without working wives. Only a quarter of the latter earn as much or more than the median income for families for all married-couple families: $36,431 annually. As economist Thurow says, "The pattern is rapidly shifting toward a way of life in which both husband and wife work full time."

As is well known, the size of households has steadily shrunk – from 3.67 members in 1970 to 2.66 in 1987 – due to declining fertility, divorce, and people striking out on their own. If the size of households has shrunk, their number has necessarily mushroomed. The number of households grew by 39 percent from 1970 to 1985, while the national population expanded by only 17 percent. And because of the baby boom, the number of households headed by the relatively youthful (21 to 29 years) has grown during the 1980s.

Meanwhile, either because of neglect or frustrated social policy, U.S. poverty has not showed any pattern of decline in the last two decades. From 1960 to 1969 poverty had declined from 22.4 percent to 12.1 percent of the population. In 1986 it was 13.6 percent.

Keeping the Dream Alive

Probably no tidy single link connects these disparate issues. It's not likely that economic problems inexorably shrank households, nor that the entrance of more women into the labor force necessarily caused lower fertility. (Nor is lower fertility generally considered to cause economic stagnation, though there are those who take this view.)

Economist Robert J. Samuelson argues that the creation of new, smaller households by young people represents a kind of liberation. "Would today's dissatisfied working mothers – single or otherwise – feel better if trapped in miserable marriages or bored stiff at home. Prosperity has created new choices, and if all the choices aren't perfect, they may be better than yesterday's lack of choices."

But if there is a sense of unease, in the final analysis, it could be because middle classers may be pursuing a goal that could be as much psychological as economic. Economist Levy theorizes another kind of change – a change in expectations. In 1955, the average male of 40 could anticipate a rise of 27 percent in his income during the next 10 years. And fantasize even greater opportunities for his children.

The average male of 40 now feels fortunate to keep pace with inflation. (Ignore for a moment Samuelson's argument that the average male of 30 starts out with a much higher salary than his forbears.)

In the Levy and Michel view, trends toward greater labor participation represent an "act of levitation" by households to maintain or increase their prosperity despite everything – in particular, despite relatively stagnant incomes. Concurrent trends such as increased consumer debt, later marriage, and delayed childbearing could all be interpreted as similar acts of economic levitation.

While the verdict is far from in, it's possible that the social history of the "vanishing" middle class can be explained as Americans trying to keep up prior rates of growth even though productivity and wage growth wherewithal may be lacking. Trying to keep the dream alive, if not with cash, then with credit.

– A.H.

SURVEY REPORT

Burundi

A tiny landlocked country in East-Central Africa, the Republic of Burundi has a 1988 population of 5 million, and may reach 10 million by 2010. The preliminary results of the 1987 Demographic and Health Survey of 3,970 women 15 to 49, including 547 couples in which both wife and husband were interviewed, showed little evidence that fertility will decline in the near future.

The 1987 DHS measured a total fertility rate, or average number of lifetime births, of 7.0 children per woman for 1982 to 1987. Women age 45 to 49, at the end of their reproductive period, had borne an average of 7.3 children during their lives, indicating that fertility has been stable for several decades.

The women surveyed said they wanted to have about 5.6 children – considerably fewer than current rates. The husbands gave similar responses, preferring 5.5 children, on average.

Among married women, 24 percent did not want to have any more children, and 53 percent wanted to delay the next birth for at least two years. Nearly 90 percent of the husbands and wives surveyed said they approved of family planning.

Although 77 percent of the women expressed an interest in controlling their fertility, the DHS found only 8.7 percent of the married women were using any form of birth control in 1987. Over half of those contracepting relied on the rhythm method, and one-fourth used withdrawal or abstinence. Only 1.2 percent of the wives (14 percent of those contracepting) were using a more effective method like the pill, injectibles, or the IUD. Some 64 percent knew of one or more modern methods and 59 percent said they knew where to obtain them, but only 30 percent of the wives had ever used contraception.



Burundi farmers

In sharp contrast, over 90 percent of the husbands knew a family planning method, and just over one-half had used one. However, the husbands were most familiar with traditional methods and with injectibles; less than one-half knew any of the other modern methods.

While the knowledge and use of family planning was markedly higher in the urban area – which consists of one city, the capital Bujumbura – the high illiteracy, low living-standards, and lack of infrastructure has hindered the spread of family planning information and services into the countryside where 96 percent of the people live. Without a substantial change in these conditions, fertility is not likely to decline in the near future. The Burundi government favors family planning for health reasons, but stops short of supporting it to lower fertility rates.

The final results of the 1987 DHS will be published jointly in 1988 by the Burundi Ministry of the Interior and the Institute for Resource Development of Columbia, Md.

– *M.K.*

Balancing Food and Population

World food production is rising, but population is also increasing, and so are the numbers of those who, either temporarily or chronically, do not have sufficient food.

PRB's latest *Bulletin*, "Food and Population: Beyond Five Billion," by Peter Hendry, describes the present world of over 5 billion people where feast and famine – food shortages and food surpluses – occur simultaneously. The U.S. Government pays farmers not to plant crops, to cut surpluses and prevent further erosion, while also providing more than 19 million people a month with food stamps so they can obtain food.

The developing countries, with about three-quarters of the world's population, account for less than half of the production of major food crops.

An illustration of the food/population dynamic is that although production of food staples in North Africa and the Middle East is projected to expand at about the same rate as that of Asia, about 2.9 percent annually, owing to a much more rapid rate of population increase, they will achieve only a 0.2 percent annual increase in output per person, compared with a 1.4 percent annual growth rate in Asia.

Balancing population, food, and resources for sustained survival is a continual process.

The principal cause of hunger and malnutrition is poverty: the extent of popular access to gainful employment, to arable land, to suitable technologies determines nutritional status more than aggregate food production. The physical problems are much more tractable than the human problems.

Copies of "Food and Population: Beyond Five Billion" by Peter Hendry, the 40-page *Population Bulletin* (Vol. 43, No. 2, April 1988) can be ordered from PRB, Circulation Dept., P.O. Box 96152, Wahsington, D.C. 20090-6152, with checks payable to PRB. Prices are: $4.00 per single copy; 2-10 copies, $3.00 each; 11-50 copies, $2.50 each; over 50, $2.00 each. Orders for $50.00 or less must be prepaid and include $1.00 for postage and handling.

DEMOGRAPHER'S PAGE

Consequences Of Ultra-Low Fertility

by Lincoln H. Day

This article is adapted from the author's paper read at the European Population Conference, Jyväskylä, Finland, June 11-16, 1987.

A great deal of ink has been spilled over the economic implications of highly effective birth control methods. But this ongoing revolution in reproduction is likely to have other, even wider, social consequences.

Suppose virtually everyone exercised complete control over fertility? What then? What are the likely demographic and social implications?

For purposes of discussion, let us assume that "complete" control over fertility means control over both the number of children and, within physiological limits, the timing of childbirth. Such extensive control is already widespread in most European populations, whether in Europe, North America, or Oceania. Thus, what can be said about its future consequences can in large measure be said about conditions already occurring. My discussion deals, therefore, with differences essentially of degree rather than of kind.

Individual Consequences

One likely consequence is improved individual health among children who are born. This would result from a lower incidence of childbirth at the youngest and oldest extremes of the mother's fecund period, the proper spacing of births, and the fact that the children born would truly be "wanted" children.

What about what some consider to be the "problem" of only children? Their proportion is very likely to increase. John Aird reports that some Chinese writers, reflecting upon the consequences of their country's one-child policy, foresee a generation of children "doted upon by parents and grandparents and treated by the state as privileged individuals in regard to health care, education, and employment opportunities."[1]

Some bulletins from China claim that the swollen numbers of only children are already becoming "spoiled, self-centered, inclined to immediate gratification, willful, disrespectful toward authority . . ." Aird notes.

Only children have long received a bad press – particularly, it seems, in English-speaking countries overseas. On the other hand, there are numerous claims based on psychological and sociological inquiries as to the "superiority" of only children. The real question, ultimately, is whether only children are more likely than children with siblings to develop into socially acceptable adults. But, so far, the studies of only children do not extend to adult behavior, nor do they consider anything that might reasonably be defined as socially significant. The only exception I know of is an effort I myself made recently using American data, the conclusion of which was that there was no difference whatsoever between only children and sibling children.

> Much concern about older age structure arises from misunderstanding

Status of Women

Control over fertility offers women greater independence and status by affording them more opportunity to acquire education and training, obtain employment outside the home, advance in a career, and earn incomes of their own. The extent to which such opportunities can, in the individual case, be realized will, of course, be much affected by the social setting – from employment possibilities to educational offerings to the availability of social services like public transportation and child care. But there are some countervailing demographic pressures that may be less obvious.

Take, for example, the situation of older middle-aged women in their 50s or 60s. As a result of recent gains in adult longevity, these women are expected to assume major responsibility in caring for their aged relatives. At the same time, because of historically high rates of marital dissolution, these same women are being called upon to provide care and comfort to their adult children experiencing marital difficulties, as well as to grandchildren needing care so that a single supporting parent – usually the mother – can go out to work.

Thus, the opportunities for greater independence and higher status afforded this group of older women by having had complete control over childbearing may not be realized because of demands on them resulting from demographic trends (greater longevity) and social trends (dissolution of marriages).

An Older Population

Control over fertility is obviously conducive to an older age structure. Proportions will be smaller in the younger ages, larger in the older; the extent of this being determined by how far fertility declines. Much of the concern expressed about older age structures seems to arise out of misunderstanding, emotion, and ignorance of causal relationships. Nonetheless, age structure deserves to be taken seriously, if only because it is the prime factor establishing the dimensions of retirement and pension programs in modern society.

However useful it may be for administrative purposes to plan or estab-

Lincoln Day is a senior fellow in the Dept. of Demography, Australian National University

lish eligibility for programs for the aged in terms of birthdays, the relation between age and need is not necessarily direct. Much depends on habits of life prior to old age: on diet, exercise, and the intake of drugs, for instance. Much also depends on contemporary conditions like air quality, environmental noise, and the availability of appropriate housing. Moreover, aging is as much a social and psychological process as it is a biological one. Aging cannot be prevented, but *when* aging begins and *how* it manifests itself may well be explained less by considerations of birthdays than by conditions of life.

The cost of public programs for the aged is not immutable. Some savings can be effected by introducing elements of means-testing, like the progressive taxation of pensions as a part of regular income. And certainly savings will result from a reduced proportion of the population in the younger, dependent ages. Moreover, the aged will presumably have had a lifetime of work behind them. It is not as though everyone else were suddenly to be called upon to provide economic support for some sector of the population taking no hand in supporting itself. Programs such as forced savings that enable the aged to support themselves largely, perhaps entirely, through earnings garnered during their peak working years will need to be developed and extended. So too will services that enable them to take care of most of their noneconomic needs without undue reliance on others.

Nor would the aged monopolize these services and facilities, many of which – for example, public transportation, walk-in health maintenance and counseling services, public spaces where one can be by oneself or meet people on an informal basis, inexpensive rental housing – will also be useful to other age groups, perhaps especially to children and young adults. And then, of course, it is worth remembering that the aged, in addition to helping themselves and one another, also often lend support to younger elements of the society – caring for children, extending financial help to relatives, or giving emotional support. The intergenerational "wealth flow" – whether economic, social, or emotional – is by no means all in one direction.

When Does "Aged" Begin?

Besides, what is "aged"? Following the usual demographic definition of "aged" as beginning at 65, the Swedish population is 80 percent more "aged" today than it was half a century ago; the British and Dutch, 70 percent more "aged" the West German, about half again as "aged" and the French, only a tenth more.

But suppose we employ a different – but no more arbitrary – type of demographic definition: namely, those in the age categories having less than 10 years' life expectancy at present rates. Under this definition, the increase in the proportion "aged" during this period is much reduced: from 80 percent down to about 30 percent in Sweden, from 70 percent down to about 15 percent in Britain and about zero percent in the Netherlands, and from 50 to zero percent in West Germany, and to an actual decline of about one-fourth in France.[2] To be sure, aging has occurred, but much less so by this arguably more socially and demographically meaningful criterion than by the purely chronological criterion commonly applied.

> Consequences of low fertility will depend on a host of non-demographic factors

Complete control over childbearing means that fertility could hold steady at no more than replacement level for an indefinitely long period – surely, given the fact of earthly limits, an ultimately desirable, even necessary, development. But it also holds out the possibility of remaining for long periods at *below* replacement level.

Fertility is currently below replacement in some 25 countries, most of them European. In many it is at its lowest level ever; in most, it has been below replacement for over a decade. Although numerical decline itself has yet to occur in more than a few of these countries, such declines can probably be anticipated in most of them within a few decades.

Demography Is Not Everything

Population decline as a result of low fertility is such a recent phenomenon in modern human experience that its consequences are by no means certain. For many countries, the prospect of numerical decline is disquieting, raising fears of all sorts of things, from labor shortages and wage inflation to race suicide and declines in national "vigor."

The effects of decline may vary, however, depending how far below replacement fertility actually falls and how long it remains there. Certainly the consequences will depend on a host of nondemographic factors – factors that may, in fact, exceed the demographic in importance. We must beware of demographic determinism. Demographic factors set limits, but these limits are ordinarily very broad.

To take one instance: If current, unusually low fertility levels continue (which may or may not happen), many years would pass before these populations experienced numerical declines sufficient to reduce numbers to what they were on the eve of World War II – a level arguably sufficient for any legitimate national purpose, including maintenance of an identifiable national culture and lifestyle.

Starting now, it would take, for example, another 42 years for Austria to reach that number; 52 years for Denmark and West Germany; 58 for Italy;

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Demographer's Page

Continued from preceding page

65 for Sweden and the United Kingdom; 81 for the Netherlands and Norway; and 131 for France. And this is assuming that fertility remains at what for most of these populations are the lowest levels in their history.

The populations reaching those sizes equal to what they were on the eve of World War II would indeed have age structures older than those of their numerical counterparts of that earlier time. This would be so however old age was defined. But if old age were defined as beginning when life expectancy is less than 10 years, the increase in the proportion "aged" would be more modest – some 25 to 40 percent less – than if it were defined, in the usual way, as commencing at age 65.

This is very likely an extreme scenario, but assuming fertility were to remain as low as it now is, surely a lot can happen in 42 to 131 years. Population may set the stage for economic and social change, but it is unlikely to be a prime determinant of the outcome in countries exercising extensive control over childbearing. Nor, depending a bit on your perspective, could the changes envisaged in such demographic processes be viewed as occurring very suddenly. We are not talking here about something like a baby boom that in a year or two could theoretically introduce into the age structure a cohort double the size of its immediate predecessor.

Finally, a decline in numbers, far from being wholly undesirable, could actually open up a lot of opportunities, particularly with respect to improving the quality of life and bringing human numbers, life styles, and consumption patterns into better alignment with ecological and physical reality. Surely in any rational sense, one has to find this a reassuring prospect.

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2. United Nations, *Demographic Yearbook* for 1949-1950, Table 4; for 1960, Table 5; for 1983, Tables 7 and 22.

What the DHS Has Achieved

Informed decisions about family planning and health prevention measures can only be made when reliable and accurate data are available. What kind of contraceptives are in use and who uses them? How long do mothers breastfeed? What are a country's mortality and fertility rates?

Surveys from 30 developing countries are now being released, as the U.S. AID-funded Demographic and Health Surveys Program (DHS) nears its fifth anniversary.

The surveys give details of the health status and family planning practices of 12 African, 8 Asian and Near Eastern, and 10 Latin American and Caribbean nations.

The program, part of Westinghouse's Institute for Resource Development (IRD), is gathering data from women between the reproductive ages of 15-49. Survey samples range from 3,000-12,000 respondents. The program follows the earlier World Fertility and Contraceptive Prevalence Surveys, adding to worldwide knowledge about health and population.

Findings from the 35 surveys are being published as Preliminary Reports, First Country Reports (a comprehensive report of survey findings), and Summary Reports, in each country's language. First Country reports for El Salvador and Brazil have been published. Other reports from Peru, the Dominican Republic, Colombia, Ecuador, Sri Lanka, Morocco, Nepal, Burundi, Liberia, Nigeria, and Senegal are nearing completion. (PRB's IMPACT project is lending technical assistance to Westinghouse to help further the goal of reaching policy makers with the Summary Reports.)

To speed data analysis and dissemination of survey results, DHS trained in-country staff to use microcomputers, driven by a new software package – Integrated System for Survey Analysis (ISSA) – that it developed for the program. ISSA facilitates data entry, editing, and tabulating. The package will soon be released in the U.S. for $325 (this includes some user support).

The Studies in Family Planning series is publishing results of the DHS surveys under a new section entitled "Data."

In addition, DHS is making its questionnaires, interviewer's manuals, supervisor's manual, sampling manual, and other field questionnaires available for study through regional depositories and selected libraries.

Recently, Guatemalans were confronted by some of their countrymen and women armed with small plastic boxes that in fact turned out to be laptop computers. DHS interviewers conducted the laptop experiment to test the effectiveness of using portable computers for interviewing.

Undoubtedly one aim of the experiment is to cut down the 12 months it takes from completion of field work to publication of First Country reports. If the experiment succeeds, the laptops may become a common sight in rural areas of the Third World as instant surveys of populations are created.

– S.G.

Bulletin Errata

After PRB's February 1988 *Bulletin*, "Demographics: People and Markets," emphatically explained the differences between "household" and "family," we turned right around and mixed up the two on page 10, which states that "average *family* size has undergone a precipitous decline" instead of what we meant to say, "average *household* size has undergone . . ."

In the same section on households and families, the percentages were inadvertently omitted from Figures 4 and 5. To help readers interpret the figures, the following table provides the missing information.

Type	Figure 4 Percent of total households 1960	1985	Figure 5 Percent of growth in households, 1960-85
Non-family households	15	28	48
Families with			
single male heads	3	2	2
single female heads	7	12	18
married couples, children	44	28	2
married couples, no children	31	30	30

Projecting the USSR's Population

The Center for International Research of the U.S. Census Bureau has recently released *Estimates and Projections of the Population of the USSR—1979 to 2025.*

Its methodology assumes zero net migration. Emigration has amounted to only 500,000 in the entire postwar period and present levels are very low. Future mortality patterns are assumed to continue the current trend of slowly rising life expectancy, partially a result of an anti-alcoholism campaign, from about 69 years at birth to about 77 by 2025.

Soviet fertility has risen in the 1980s, perhaps in response to 26th Party Congress measures in 1981 granting partially paid maternity leave for women at their jobs for at least one year, some provision of housing for married couples, small lump sum payments upon births, and other incentives. Although the effects of such measures are difficult to gauge, the total fertility rate (TFR) did rise from an average of 2.3 lifetime births per woman in the early 1980s to about 2.5 in 1986.

The obvious question centers on the continued apparent success the government may or may not have in maintaining higher fertility levels. The "medium" series assumes that Soviet fertility will show a brief rise following initiation of pronatalist policies, but quickly decline to the previous low level. This pattern has in fact been seen in a number of Eastern European countries. Thus in the medium series, fertility is assumed to decline to a TFR of 2.1 by 2025.

In the "high" series, fertility is assumed to follow the "Romanian model" thought to occur from the imposition of more stringent pronatalist measures. Under this scenario, the TFR rises to 2.75 by 2025. Finally, the "low" series assumes that the USSR will follow Western European experience and see its TFR decline to 1.5. This latter series would certainly imply unusually low fertility for the Asian and Moslem Republics of the USSR and very low fertility among ethnic Russian women.

These three scenarios result in a 2025 population range of 82 million. But the low series' growth rate in 2025 would be about zero compared to 1 percent in the high series with a resultant annual growth of 4 million. —*C.H.*

SOFTWHERE

World Development Indicators is a software package consisting of economic and social data indicators for countries of the world, as reported in the latest World Bank annual, the *1987 World Development Report*. Summoned up on a personal computer, the Report's voluminous data can be studied to identify significant relationships, compare economic indexes, sort and rank, display tables and graphs, and conduct advanced statistical analysis.

The Bank's diskettes are available in either of two versions for the IBM PC or compatibles: Lotus 1-2-3 WKS format (for Lotus version 1A or higher) or .PRN format (for importation into most other graphic, spreadsheet, database, or text software). A set of instructions and a complimentary copy of the most recent (English) edition of the *World Development Report* is included. Cost for either version is $95.00. Call or write: World Bank Bookstore, 701 18th St. NW., Washington, DC. 20433. (202) 473-2941.

—*D.L.*

POPULATION UPDATE

Estimated United States Population:

As of December 1, 1987	244,799,000
As of December 1, 1986	242,577,000

The above estimates, the latest available, include armed forces overseas and are from U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Current Population Reports*, Series P-25, No. 1016.

Estimated World Population:

As of March 1988	5,098,000,000
Annual growth	87,000,000

Estimated by extrapolation from the mid-1987 population on PRB's *World Population Data Sheet*.

Latest Provisional Statistics for the U.S.: November 1987

	12 months ending with November					
	Number		Rate			
Item	1987	1986	1987	1986	1985	1984
Live births	3,812,000	3,739,000	15.7	15.5	15.8	15.6
Deaths	2,121,000	2,102,000	8.7	8.7	8.8	8.6
Natural increase	1,691,000	1,637,000	7.0	6.8	7.0	7.0
Marriages	2,407,000	2,387,000	9.9	9.9	10.2	10.5
Divorces	1,159,000	1,158,000	4.8	4.8	5.0	4.9
Infant deaths	37,800	39,000	9.9	10.5	10.5	10.6
Population base (in millions)			243.1	240.8	238.1	235.9

Note: Rates are given per 1,000 population, except for infant deaths, which are given per 1,000 live births.

Source: *Monthly Vital Statistics Report* (Vol. 36, No. 11) from the National Center for Health Statistics.

TAKE A NUMBER

Milestone: Infant mortality in the United States quietly passed a threshold in the 12-month period ending November 1987 – its first year below "double figures." The provisional rate for that period was 9.9 infant deaths per 1,000 live births, down from 10.6 for the same period in 1984.

How We Live and Marry (Or Don't): The latest published data from the Census Bureau's Current Population Survey, *Marital Status and Living Arrangements: March 1986*, details just how much household formation has changed since 1960 in the United States. In 1960, only 9 percent of children below age 18 lived with one parent, a figure which rose to one in four by 1986. Among whites in 1986, 18 percent of children lived with one parent, while for Hispanics and blacks the proportions were 30 and 53 percent, respectively. Delayed marriage, a trend which began to take off in the 1970s, continues to accelerate in the 1980s. In both 1960 and 1970, the percentage of women ages 25-29 who had never married was a steady 10.5 percent, but by 1980 the figure has risen to 20.9. In the first six years of the '80s, the figure jumped to 28.1. And, the number of unmarried-couple households, or POSSLQs – persons of the opposite sex sharing living quarters – rose to 2.2 million from 1.6 million in 1980 and 0.4 million in 1970.

China's Population Trend Headed in Opposite Direction: The baby boom which began in China in 1986 appears to have continued in 1987, perhaps reflecting a pent-up desire for births delayed in the recent past, improving economic conditions for some, and an increase in the number of marriages in 1986. A Chinese survey indicated that only half of couples in cities and towns wished to limit themselves to one child and that 90 percent of the large rural majority want 2 or more children. The family planning program has been described as "out of control" or "semi-controlled." The current situation should not overshadow the past remarkable successes of the Chinese campaign; it may be inevitable that the rapid imposition of stringent measures will ultimately lead to a "backlash" for a time.

Here and There How low could fertility in West Germany go? That was the question as the country set a record low total fertility rate (TFR) of 1.3 lifetime births per woman in the early 1980s. Well, births were up in 1986 and early returns for 1987 suggest that the TFR has risen to 1.4. The new holder of the claim to the lowest fertility could be Italy, although corroborating data are not yet in.

– *C.H.*

POSITIONS/ PROFESSIONALS

Assistant Professor of Sociology, Bowling Green University; a tenure-track position beginning August 1988. Must be able to teach courses in demographic methods, market demography, and population forecasting in graduate program in applied demography. PhD required. Send letter of application, vita, and three letters of reference to: Personnel Committee, Population Studies Program, Dept. of Sociology, Bowling Green State University, Bowling Green, Ohio 43403. Affirmative Action/Equal Opportunity Employer.

ADDENDA

Broadcasting, The News magazine of the Fifth Estate

"Red Skelton and I were in the top 20 or 15 or something. Then CBS started this demographics thing. They said we had a large audience, but our people were too old and weren't buying anything our sponsors were selling. I couldn't understand that. Neither could Red. He called me [and] said, 'What the hell are demographics?' I said, 'I haven't the slightest idea.'"

– Jackie Gleason

The Red Skelton Show was last broadcast on CBS on June 23, 1970.
The Jackie Gleason Show was last broadcast on Sept. 12, 1970.

CURRENT READINGS

PRB welcomes materials on population topics for possible inclusion in Current Readings. Publishers may address review copies to Book Review Editor, POPULATION TODAY, Population Reference Bureau, 777 14th St., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005.

WORLD POPULATION POLICIES (Vol. 1.), compiled by the Dept. of International Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations. New York: Population Studies #102, 1987. 247 pages. $28.00. ISBN 92-1-151165-8.

This is the first of three volumes to be published by the United Nations regarding the population policy of each of its 170 Member States as well as some Non-Member States. This first volume contains countries from A to F. Volumes II and III, which should be available by 1989, will list countries from G to N, and from O to Z, respectively. The information presented is culled from the Population Policy Data Bank, which is maintained by the Population Division of the Dept. of International Economic and Social Affairs.

Excellent summaries of population policies are given for each listed country, as well as concise but comprehensive views of the demographic background and context within which these policies must function. Basic demographic indicators are provided; population size and growth, age structure, mortality, morbidity, fertility, nuptiality, international migration, urbanization, and spatial distribution of the population. The current official government perception of each of these indicators is also provided. The general policy framework in each country is presented, including the overall approach to population problems and the importance of population policy in achieving the development objectives that each country considers important.

The volume outlines the availability and sources of demographic data and briefly discusses the integration of population issues within development planning. It offers governmental policies and measures in regard to changes in demographic indicators and includes a note on the status of women. It even provides a detailed map of each country showing, cities, roads, railroads, and airports.

World Population Policies presents an important and useful summary of international demographic information. When the series is complete, it will represent an excellent resource for all who share an interest in population and development.

– Judy C. Felt

COMPARATIVE STUDY OF FERTILITY CONTROL EXPERIENCES IN REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND REPUBLIC OF CHINA, prepared by the Korea Institute for Population and Health and Taiwan Provincial Institute of Family Planning. Taipei: Chinese Center for International Training in Family Planning, 1987. 247 pages.

This volume consists of six papers presented at a workshop jointly sponsored by two population organizations – one from Korea, one from Taiwan – held Nov. 3-10, 1986, in Seoul, Korea. Every subject is discussed by a researcher from each country.

The first section gives a general overview of the socioeconomic background of each country and development of population policy. Cost-effectiveness analyses are also presented for some family planning programs implemented since the early 1960s. In the second section, national population projections, 1985-2025, are shown in detail. Anticipated changes in population size, basic vital rates, age structure, i.e., aging of population, and the socioeconomic implications are discussed. Two other papers cover contraceptive discontinuation and failure rates. (They are estimated based on the 1985 national level survey of each country by using life-table methods.)

A number of tables and appendices are provided. They contain abundant information about the populations of Korea and Taiwan. Contraceptive prevalence, discontinuation, and failure rates are presented by five-year age groups, marital status, number of children, and other socioeconomic characteristics of users. Readers can see which contraceptive method was used most and which one had the highest rate of discontinuation or failure by which users and for what reasons.

Both countries stated that they had achieved replacement level fertility and more than 70 percent contraceptive practice (among married women age 15 to 44) by 1985, which are preliminary goals of their fertility control policy integrated into socioeconomic development plans. Next they face the challenge of developing social security systems.

This volume will be interesting not only for those studying Korea and Taiwan, but also for anyone interested in the whole area of fertility control or in the future of the world's newly industrializing countries (NICs).

– Machiko Yanagishita

Books Received

CITIES OF THE WORLD (3rd ed.), edited by Margaret Walsh Young and Susan L. Stetler. Detroit, Mich.: Gale Research, 1987. 3,268 pages in 4 volumes. $245.00/set (cloth).

HOMICIDE, by Martin Daly and Margo Wilson. Hawthorne, N.Y.: Walter de Gruyter, 1988. 328 pages. $42.95 cloth; $18.95 paper.

MALTHUS, by Donald Winch. (Past Masters Series.) New York: Oxford University Press, 1987. 117 pages. $18.95 hardback; $4.95 paper.

ZIMBABWE

Population (1987 est.): 9.4 million
Land area: 151,000 sq. miles
Births per 1,000 pop.: 47
Deaths per 1,000 pop.: 12
Rate of natural increase: 3.5 percent
Total fertility rate: 6.5 children per woman
Infant mortality rate: 76 infant deaths per 1,000 live births
Life expectancy at birth: 57 years
GNP per capita: $650
Capital: Harare

by Wendy Patriquin

Formerly known as Rhodesia, Zimbabwe is a California-sized country in South-Central Africa, just north of South Africa. The majority of the population is African, but there are about 100,000 whites, 20,000 coloreds (persons of mixed race), and 10,000 Asians. The Africans are divided into two major language groups: the Mashona, about 80 percent of the population, and the Matabele, about 19 percent of the population. Most of the whites, primarily of British descent, arrived in Zimbabwe after World War II, but their numbers have been decreasing rapidly since independence in 1980. English is the official language and is spoken by the white population and understood, if not always used, by more than half of the blacks.

Between 1923, when the British South African Company ended its control of Rhodesia, and 1980, when it became independent Zimbabwe, the country was an internally self-governing colony with its own legislature, civil service, armed forces, and police. The European settlers controlled the government and Great Britain would not grant independence to Rhodesia until the colonial government made some move toward eventual majority rule.

In 1965 the conservative government of Ian Smith came to power trying to maintain the Europeans' dominant position and refused to make this move. He issued a Unilateral Declaration of Independence from the U.K., which that government considered illegal and unconstitutional. As a result the UN Security Council, for the first time in its history, called upon nations to impose mandatory economic sanctions on a country. It was not until 1976 that the Smith government agreed in principle to majority rule. An agreement was reached in December 1979, and Robert Mugabe formed the first government of Zimbabwe as a result of elections held in February 1980.

Since independence, rifts have developed between the black nationalist leaders Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo, and this rivalry between these two men and their parties continues. There has been some guerrilla activity in rural areas and antigovernment dissidence creating security and economic problems.

Zimbabwe's high plateau (veld) is endowed with a broad range of natural resources, which should provide for sustained economic growth. It has large mineral deposits including coal, asbestos, copper, nickel, gold, and iron ore. Besides a well-developed electrical power network, there is a good infrastructure of paved roads and a vital railroad link with neighboring South Africa. Because of the trade sanctions imposed between 1965 and independence, the country had to look inward for production, so the manufacturing sector of the economy is well developed. Agriculture is also an important part of the economy with major cash crops being tobacco, corn, wheat, sugar, cotton, and cattle.

The government sees the most urgent problems of the country as being the resettlement of displaced persons, and reconstruction of roads, health establishments, and schools destroyed during guerrilla activity. The government considers the fertility level to be too high and will provide some interventions to control growth. The fertility level is considered by the government as being too high, requiring some interventions to control growth. Current levels of immigration are also considered too high and it is hoped that these too can be reduced in the future.

In 1984 a reproductive health survey was conducted in Zimbabwe. It was found that, among other things, Zimbabwe has the highest rate of contraceptive use in sub-Saharan Africa – 38 percent of currently married women were using some form of family planning. Twenty-seven percent were using a modern method.

John Riber/DSR Inc.

Zimbabwe's highveld is rich in resources.